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AIRPORT ZONING: A GROWING NEED IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
JuLiJA L. STouDmmE*
The twentieth century population explosion has necessitated
an expansion of business, industrial and residential complexes
in cities across the country. It became increasingly apparent to
city planners that future expansion needs could best be met by
restricting the use of certain lands, that is by zoning laws. Zon-
ing in the form with which we are familiar first appeared in
Germany about 18801 and has grown in use until today almost all
cities with a population of over ten thousand have some form of
zoning. Inevitably, the question of constitutionality would arise
since zoning ordinances restrict the private landowner's use of
his land. However, the landmark case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty ao.2 held that reasonable zoning ordinances did
not constitute a taking of property without due process but rather
were a proper exercise of police power.
With the constitutionality question put to rest, the door was
opened for the idea of airport zoning as a protective device for
airport approaches to become a reality. The first airport zoning
ordinance was enacted in 1928 by Alameda County, California,
and it prohibited the building or maintaining of structures over
fifty feet high within one thousand feet of any airport bound-
ary.3 Little additional progress was made in establishing airport
zoning until 1939 when the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers (hereinafter designated as NIMLO) published a model
airport zoning act and ordinance.4 During World War II and
thereafter, the airplane became more important, many more air-
ports were built and interest in aviation became more enthusias-
tic. The natural corollary to this growth in aviation was an
increase in the numbers and complexity of airport zoning prob-
lems" and changes in the methods used to solve these problems.
Since solutions have generally taken the form of legislation, an
* J.D. 1966, University of South Carolina; associate, Rogers, McDonald
and Ross, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. Zoning Information Series, City Planning Comm'n, p. 6 (1961).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. See RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS (1944).
4. Revisions in the act and ordinance were made in 1941, 1944 and 1964.
See RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS 171 (1944).
5. See YOxLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcrIcE § 202 (1953).
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examination of airport zoning enabling acts and ordinances will
lead to a better understanding of the developments in airport
zoning.6
A. Airport Zoning Legislation
There are three generally recognized methods to prevent over-
crowding around an airport: condemnation, avigation easement
and zoning ordinance.7 The first two methods generally prove
costly, as under condemnation the governmental unit must con-
demn fourteen times more land than it needs for the airport in
order to adequately protect the glide paths." Since this condem-
nation would constitute a taking of private property for public
use, just compensation would have to be paid to the landowners.9
On the other hand, zoning acts are designed to regulate airport
hazards and are based on the police power rather than eminent
domain. 10
Most state enabling acts have followed the model act formu-
lated by NBILO and the Civil Aeronautics Administration."1
This model act defines an airport hazard as "any structure or
tree or use of land which obstructs the airspace required for the
flight of aircraft in landing and taking off at an airport or is
otherwise hazardous to such landing or taking off of aircraft."'
2
6. By 1944 thirty-one states and Alaska had adopted some sort of airport
zoning. See RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS (1944). South Carolina had
its first taste of airport zoning in 1942 with the zoning of approaches to Shaw
Air Force Base in Sumter County (then Shaw Field). See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-435 (1962), which established a 40 to 1 glide path ratio.
7. Note, 48 Ky. LJ. 273 (1960).
8. Wolf, Airport Approach Zoning-A Present Need, 17 U. CiNc. L. REv.
327 (1948). Since this estimate was made in 1948, it has probably fluctuated
somewhat since then.
9. See, e.g., S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
10. See 19 TENN. L. REv. 858 (1947). This basis was established in the
1944 model act, and in 1960 about thirty-five states had a statute based on this
model. See also Note, 48 Ky. LJ. 273 (1960).
11. [A]irport zoning acts of one type or another have been adopted in all
but eight states. These acts are usually denominated Airport Zonings
Acts or Municipal Airport Approach Protection Acts and provide for
the promulgation and administration of airport approach zoning regula-
tions by subordinate units of government. Many cities have adopted air-
port zoning ordinances pursuant to the statutes, and the ordinances are
apparently working well. Most of the enabling acts have been written or
amended so as to be substantially similar to the 1944 model act formu-
lated by NIMLO and Civil Aeronautics Administration.
AoRPORT OPERATORS COUNCIL, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL PRINCPLES FOR AIRPORT
OPERATORS 14 (Feb. 1963).
12. Model Act § 1(3). See RHYNE, AmPORTS AND THE COURTS 171 (1944).
[Vol. 18
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In 1964 the scope of the model act was broadened to include "in-
compatible land uses." Such a hazard is treated as a public nui-
sance which in the interest of public safety and general welfare
may be regulated and prevented through the state's police pow-
er."' The model act is thorough in its handling of airport zoning
problems. It sets forth definitions, regulations, a procedure for
adopting ordinances, a provision for acquisition of avigation
easements, and it establishes a zoning commission and a board
of adjustment. Methods for removing non-conforming uses are
also provided. However, the most important phase of the act
is that it stresses reasonableness in all regulations and in their
application, giving it a great deal of flexibility. 14
Airport zoning enabling acts are necessary in order to give
to cities and communities the power to pass restrictive ordinances.
After the enabling act has been passed by the state, the local
governmental unit may adopt a zoning ordinance suitable for
the needs and purposes of the airports in its area. Such ordi-
nances generally can be divided into two categories. One category
regulates the type of use, requiring that any use be compatible
with the airport. Such an ordinance would prohibit, for example,
large residential complexes, churches and schools. Since this cate-
gory regulates the use of land, it falls into the general zoning
provisions held constitutional in Village of Euclid as a proper
exercise of the police power. The other kind of ordinance re-
stricts the height of structures in accordance with a set glide path
ratio.15 That is, it is not concerned with the type of structure
or its use but merely with its height. This height ordinance was
upheld in Welch 'v. Swasey'6 wherein the court stated that "in
the exercise of the police power the legislature may regulate and
limit personal rights of property in the interest of the public
health, public morals and public safety .... ,,17
B. Case History of Airport Zoning Laws
Airport zoning basically serves two purposes. First, it removes
physical hazards, such as trees, towers, smokestacks and buildings
from the airport approaches. Also, it serves to decrease the
number of suits brought against airports for damages due to
13. Id. § 3.
14. See BILLYou, An LAw (1963).
15. See AIRPORT OPERAToRs CouNcIL HI Axi'-Dox (May, 1965).
16. 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
17. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 372, 79 N.E. 745, 754 (1907).
1966]
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noise, vibration and related nuisances. In serving these purposes
the laws seek to remove four general types of hazards: structural
hazards such as smokestacks and trees; visibility hazards which
create dust, smoke, glare and gas; communications hazards which
interfere with the communications equipment on the aircraft;
and traffic hazards which must be removed for the complete
safety of the surrounding area.18 Despite these lofty purposes,
airport zoning suffered early defeats before the state courts. In
1939 the Maryland airport zoning statute was held to be uncon-
stitutional because this zoning amounted to a condemnation and
thus could not proceed under the guise of the police power.19
Later, a height and use restriction was struck down by the New
Jersey court as "an interference with the rights of property
ownership, which is not within the contemplation or purpose
of the zoning law. 20 The advent of enabling legislation, not
present earlier, seemed to be the answer in establishing the valid-
ity of airport zoning. However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that even with the enabling act, zoning would be unreason-
able, arbitrary and capricious unless the purpose of such zoning
is the elimination of airport hazards. 21
Airport zoning had not fared well in its early encounters with
the courts, but it seemed to undergo a period of reappraisal and
some liberalization in the courts' view. As time passed states be-
gan to enact enabling legislation adding a more solid basis to
zoning ordinances. This turn in events can be seen in Florida
where a height restriction ordinance was enacted pursuant to the
state's enabling statute.22 The Sarasota-Mantee Airport Author-
ity, which enacted the ordinance, sought to enjoin the erection of
an ornamental tower in excess of the height limit.23 The defend-
ant contended that the ordinance constituted a taking of private
18. See Young, Airport Zoning, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 261 (1954).
19. Mutual Chem. Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1 Av. Cas. 804 (1939).
20. Yara Eg'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 373, 40 A.2d 559,
561 (Sup. Ct. 1945). (The ordinance covered a two mile area, and the height
restrictions ranged from ten to three hundred and seventy feet. The plaintiff's
expert witness testified that the land would be worth considerably less if the
zoning ordinance were upheld.) This decision was affirmed in Rice v. City of
Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct 1945).
21. Banks v. Fayette County Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W2d
416 (Ky. 1958). (Banks was refused permission to construct a motel on
farmland one mile from the Blue Grass Airport. The circuit court upheld the
board, and Banks appealed on the ground that the effect of the restrictions
was not to eliminate congestion but to eliminate commercial use.)
22. FLA. STAT. AN. § 333.03 (1958).
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property without just compensation, but the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the ordinance.2 4 The court stated that ordinances
of this type were presumed valid, and the burden of proof was
on the person challenging it. "[C]ourts will not substitute their
judgment as to the reasonableness of a particular rule or regu-
lation where such has been duly adopted pursuant to lawful
authority when such reasonableness is fairy debatabZe.12  This
decision was a step in a liberal direction but was a rather narrow
ruling. The court enunciated the "fairly debatable" standard
thus not really ruling on the constitutionality of the statute.
Further, the structure was intended as ornamentation, not as an
important part of the landowner's business, and thus there was
no real property loss. In a subsequent Florida Court of Appeals
decision the airport zoning ordinance was upheld as constitu-
tional, and the patent need for airport zoning was recognized.
26
The court stated that the present use of the property was agri-
cultural, and the ordinance did not affect this use of the land.
However, it should be noted that this case presented a general
attack upon the statute's validity, and the court warned that a
special attack based on the height limitation would present a
different question. Thus, should a future case specifically chal-
lenge the validity of a height requirement, the Florida court
could very well find a taking of property without just com-
pensation.
When the Alabama court was presented with this precise ques-
tion, it held that the state's enabling act 27 empowered the city
"to adopt an ordinance containing as it did a blanket restriction
as to height . . . and also limit as it did the types of structures
that could be erected .. ."2s The court implied that if the re-
24. Harrel's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Mantee Airport Authority, 111
So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
25. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
26. Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).
27. Pertinent provisions of the 1961 ordinance for the city of Montgomery
are:
(b) Within an agricultural 'A' or 'B' District, no structure or tree shall
exceed two and one-half stories or thirty-five (35) feet in height, except
as hereinafter modified.
(c) Within a Heavy Industrial District no structure or tree shall exceed
three stories or forty-five (45) feet in height, except as hereinafter
modified.
These are the height restrictions cited in Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276
Ala. 166, 160 So. 2d 6 (1963).
28. Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 169, 160 So. 2d 6, 8 (1963).
1966]
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strictions were unreasonable, they could be struck down as an
'gunreasonable usurpation of the police power."2 9
Whether an ordinance can be struck down as an unconstitu-
tional taking of airspace without just compensation was dealt
with by the Indiana Supreme Court in Indiana Tol Rd. Com'n
v. JankoviA. 30 The city of Gary passed a zoning ordinance pur-
suant to authority vested in it by the state's enabling act. The
ordinance provided that no structure could be erected for a dis-
tance of six thousand feet from the end of the runway that would
interfere with the forty-to-one glide path ratio."' Jankovich
leased the airport for twenty years and spent a considerable
amount of money to improve the facilities. The Road Commis-
sion, however, constructed a road seven hundred forty-three
(743) feet from the end of the runway and at a vertical height
of twenty-five (25) feet. Based on the forty-to-one glide path
ratio, the maximum height at a distance of seven hundred
forty-three feet would be eighteen and one-half (18.5) feet, or
six and one-half (6.5) feet lower than the road in question. The
lower court's decision in favor of Jankovich was reversed by the
state supreme court. In reply to the question of who owned the
airspace above the land the court cited United States v. Causby
32
to the effect that the individual owns "at least as much of the
space above the ground as he can occupy and use in connection
with the land .... The fact that he does not occupy it in a
physical sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not
material."33 Further, the court found that the ordinance consti-
tuted a taking of the airspace surrounding the airport without
just compensation. Although Causby held that a man owned as
much airspace above his land as he could reasonably use, one
authority has recently suggested that a proper zoning ordinance
could "take" some of this airspace "so long as some reasonable
use of the land is left to the owner.1
3 4
29. Ibid.
30. 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963).
31. The forty-to-one glide path ratio means that at a distance of forty feet
from the end of the runway, a structure of one foot in height can be main-
tained, at eighty feet from the end of the runway a structure of two feet can
be maintained, and so forth. Any structure over one foot at the forty foot
point would violate the ratio.
32. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
33. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). This case was
affirmed by Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
34. Note, 31 J. Am L. & Com. 366, 370 (1965).
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When presented with the constitutional question, the Idaho
court relied on Jankovich to conclude that if the landowner's
airspace is "taken" for public use, it must be with compensation
for if the ordinance were enforced, the land values would greatly
depreciate.3 5 The court distinguished the Florida case because
therein there had been no depreciation in value. A new twist was
given to the Jankovich case when the Supreme Court dismissed
certiorari as being improvidently granted.86 The Court based its
decision on the "settled rule that where the judgment of a state
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the
other is non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the
non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and
adequate to support the judgment."37 The grounds in Jankovich
had been the state constitution"8 and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and the Supreme Court found that these
were separate grounds. In almost all cases that question the con-
stitutionality of airport zoning ordinances which restrict build-
ing heights, the challenge has been based on both the state and
the federal constitutions. Not only did the Supreme Court fail
to pass on the federal constitutionality of height restrictions,
but also, it cut off its review of such restrictions when their
validity or invalidity is based on independent state constitutional
grounds.
In Jankovich the petitioners claimed that the Indiana decision
conflicted with the Federal Airport Act, which provided that
land use in the area surrounding an airport must be compatible
with the airport, and that the best way to insure compatibility
was through airport zoning.39 Congress realized that all spon-
35. Roark v. City of CaIdwell, 87 Idaho 559, 394 P.2d 641 (1964). In 1954
the plaintiffs bought two hundred and fifty-four (254) acres of land of which
twenty acres were within the city of Caldwell and next to the airport. The
plaintiffs proceeded to plat the twenty acres for residential purposes and had
held four lots before 1961, when the ordinance in question was enacted. This
ordinance placed property into zones restricted to uses in accordance with
certain heights. The stated purposes were "to protect the airport and to
prevent improper concentration of population subject to airport hazards." If
the ordinance were enforced, the plaintiffs could use their land only for agri-
culture with certain height restrictions.
36. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
37. Id. at 489, citing Fox Film Corp. v. Miller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
38. IND. CoNsT. art 1, § 21 : "No man's particular services shall be de-
manded, without just compensation. No man's property shall be taken by law,
without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without just com-
pensation first assessed and tendered."
39. As a condition precedent to his approval of a project under this chapter,
the Administrator shall receive assurances in writing, satisfactory tohim, that ...
1966]
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sors of airport projects do not have zoning authority, and the
provision in the act for airport zoning was not intended to re-
quire that airport sponsors undertake action which would be
neither possible nor practical--such as requiring a sponsor to
purchase land adjacent to an airport where the sponsor cannot
control its use by zoning. The purpose of the act, as expressed in
its legislative history, was to discourage the building of schools
or the development of residential housing in areas where noise
levels would make such development unwise. Airport zoning is
a reasonable method by which to achieve such compatible land
use.
40
The amendments to the Federal Airport Act in 1964 have
enabled the federal government to again express its interest in
airport zoning. The federal government should be able to take
control of our airports and of zoning problems. In order to pro-
hibit prostitution the federal police power was called upon to
justify zoning around army camps during World War I. The
Supreme Court held that zoning was a reasonable scheme for the
protection of the armed forces which Congress must raise and
support under the war powers.4 ' Removal of high structures
around airports to further public welfare and to promote air
safety by zoning would seem to be an analogous situation, even
if it does interfere with the owner's rights under state law. 42
With the establishment of the Department of Transportation and
its power over air commerce, it seems that the federal government
will be able to effectively control the nation's airports. Further,
some type of federal airport zoning appears inevitable.
The existence of federal power can be found in the commerce,
war and postal clauses.43 At first glance it may seem that Con-
gress does not have the power to pass federal zoning legislation
under the postal clause. However, Congress has the power to
regulate the mail and the method of its transportation, and since
(4) appropriate action, including the adoption of zoning laws, has
been or will be taken, to the extent reasonable, to restrict the use of
land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the airport to activities
and purposes compatible with normal airport operations including landing
and take-off of aircraft. ...
78 Stat. 161, 49 U.S.C. § 1110 (1964).
40. 1964 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADmiN. NEws 187, 2068 (1964).
41. See McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).
42. Comment, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 343 (1953).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 3 (commerce) ; para. 7 (postal) ; para. 14
(war). See Smylie, Constitutionality of Federal Airport Zoning, 12 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1943).
[Vol. 18
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one method is by air and airports are needed for planes carrying
the mail, Congress would be able to establish airport zoning.
Further, Congress has declared that airspace needed to take off
and land is part of the "navigable airspace." 44
The cases which have arisen in the several states have decided
very little. Airport zoning has been held a valid exercise of the
police power only where the ordinance is reasonable, and the
purpose is related to the public safety or general welfare.45 The
ordinance must not be capricious or arbitrary. The Jankovlh
case is the hardest one to align with the other cases. There is no
reason why airport zoning ordinances should not be interpreted
as comprehensive ordinances, and the distinction between height
restrictions made by the court is questionable. If progress is to
be made in airport zoning, the courts must take a more progres-
sive attitude and distinguish between the valid exercise of police
power and eminent domain at a point established by the reason-
ableness test. If the federal government chooses to regulate air-
ports and airport zoning, it has the power to do so and may make
use of this power in the future.
44. 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964): "'Navigable Air-
space' means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by
regulations issued under this chapter, and shall include airspace needed to
insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft." Further, it should be kept
in mind that federal aid to airports is an important facet of the airport finance,
and in order to qualify for federal aid, the Federal Aviation Agency requires
a fifty to one glide path ratio.
Zoning has been recommended by the Doolittle Commission, appointed by
President Truman in 1951 to investigate a series of serious airplane crashes
in the Newark, New Jersey area. After several months of intensive study, this
commission made several recommendations, among which were:
4. Incorporate cleared runway extension areas into airports. The domi-
nant runways of new airport projects should be protected by cleared
extensions at each end of at least one-half mile in length and 1,000 feet
wide. This area should be completely free from housing or any other
form of obstruction. Such extensions should be considered as an integral
part of the airport.
5. Establish effective zoning laws. A fan shaped zone beyond the half-
mile cleared extension described in Recommendation 4, at least two miles
long and 6,000 feet wide at its outer limits should be established at new
airports by zoning law, air easement or land purchase at the end of
dominant runways. In this area, the height of buildings and also the use
of the land should be controlled to eliminate the erection of places of
public assembly, churches, hospitals, schools, etc., and to restrict resi-
dences to the more distant locations within the zone."
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N REP., Tn AIRPORT AND ITS NEIGHBORS (1952).
45. Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 160 So. 2d 6 (1963) ; War-
ing v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1962) ; Harrel's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v.
Sarasota-Mantee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
1966]
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0. Airport Zoning in South Carolina
While South Carolina stands at the threshold of what could
be a period of progressive airport zoning, great strides must be
made. For example, there is no specific statewide enabling act,
such as the model act, which empowers the enactment of munici-
pal or county ordinances. The only zoning ordinance in South
Carolina at present is the one establishing zoning for Shaw Air
Force Base.46 This statute was enacted in 1945, and although
the need for it has ceased, it has remained a law of record and
has never been contested.
The only general zoning legislation for the state is limited to
counties containing a city with a population of over twenty-three
thousand,47 a rather impractical requirement for airport zoning
purposes since very few South Carolina cities are that large. The
section of the code known as the County Planning Act 48 seems
to allow the enactment of an airport zoning ordinance which the
county governing body would have the authority to adopt.49
In 1962 the General Assembly enacted enumerated powers and
duties for the Richland-Lexington Airport Commission and in-
eluded therein was the power to establish a zoning ordinance or
regulation. This enactment is of particular significance to the
Columbia Municipal Airport. Before such a regulation can be
adopted, a public hearing must be held and proper notice given.50
This section also gives the Commission the authority to use a
fifty-to-one glide path ratio in restricting the height of struc-
tures extending ten thousand feet laterally from the center of
the runway increasing in width from one thousand feet to an
outer limit of ten thousand feet. On all adjacent land the com-
mission has the power to restrict the structure height by using
a fifteen-to-one glide path ratio for a distance of two thousand
five hundred feet. This section does not establish an airport zon-
ing ordinance but only gives the commission power to promul-
gate one, a power they have not exercised thus far.
Without a clear mandate for zoning, as through an enabling
act, the question whether South Carolina will allow airport zon-
ing is left open. There is always the possibility that a local ordi-
46. S.C. CODE ANx. § 2-435 (1962). This is a height restriction, and it uses
a forty to one glide path ratio.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-351 (Supp. 1965).
48, S.C. CODE AxN. § 14-351 to -384 (1962).
49. S.C. CODE ANi. §§ 14-353, -354, -400.508 (1962).
50. S.C. CODE ANr. § 2-390.16(7) (1962).
[Vol. 18
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nance would be declared invalid as occurred in Maryland and
New Jersey many years ago.51 By reading several code sections
together, it is possible to infer that South Carolina would permit
airport zoning. Clearly this is not an adequate answer, and even
if accepted only a handful of counties would be affected. Thus,
a zoning act, preferably patterned after the model act, is sorely
needed in this state in order to establish a firm legal basis for
local zoning ordinances. If South Carolina enacted the model
act and a zoning ordinance were passed, 52 the question then
would be whether a height restriction was valid or rather con-
stituted a "taking" of private property. The code provides that
a zoning ordinance may "regulate and restrict the height ...
of buildings and other structures. . . .15 There does not seem
to be any difference between height restrictions in cities, held
constitutional in Welch v. Swasey,54 and height restrictions in
airport ordinances. Even so, the courts in various states insist
on drawing this distinction, and it can only be hoped that future
cases will not find it necessary to draw such flimsy distinctions.
The South Carolina Constitution has a due process clause
similar to the fifth amendment, providing that no person can be
deprived of property without due process of law.55 Ownership of
airspace is by statute vested in the several owners of the surface
beneath,56 but this ownership has been restricted by the Cauby
doctrine to such airspace which is usable in connection with the
land. In order to determine whether a height restriction would
constitute a "taking" of private property and deny due process
of law, several cases have interpreted the due process clauses of
the state constitution.
57
The leading case in this area is Gasue v. Town of Conway,"
wherein the court stated that an actual taking of the land was
51. Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A2d 559 (Sup.
Ct. 1945) (supra note 20 and accompanying text); Mutual Chem. Co. v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 1 Av. Cas. 804 (1939) (supra note 19 and accompanying
text).
52. Under the authority of S.C. CoDE ANN. § 2-390.16(7) (1962).
53. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-1001 (1962).
54. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
55. S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 5. The constitution also provides that "private
property shall not be taken for private use without consent of the owner, nor
for public use without just compensation being first made therefor." S.C.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
56. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 2-4 (1962).
57. S.C. COxST. art. 1, § 17.
58. 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E2d 871 (1940).
1.966]
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not necessary. To deprive the owner of the "ordinary beneficial
use and enjoyment of his property is, in law, equivalent to the
taking of it, and is as much a 'taking' as though the property
itself were actually appropriated." 59 Admitting that what
amounts to a taking is not always clear, the court put forth a
general rule that "there is a taking where the act involves the
actual interference with, or the disturbance of, property rights,
resulting in injuries which are not merely consequential or inci-
dental .. ."0o Thus, where an ordinance restricts the use, enjoy-
ment or disposal of property, due process has been violated, and
the proper route for the governmental unit may well be con-
demnation rather than zoning.6 '
The South Carolina cases have consistently followed the
Gasque concept of what constitutes a taking of property. Under
the Cauby doctrine and Section 24 of the South Carolina Code,
the private landowner owns such airspace above his land as he
might possibly use in connection with his land. This enunciation,
combined with the prior airport zoning decisions in other states
which have held that height restrictions constitute a taking of
property, leads to the conclusion that any restriction of the air-
space in South Carolina will constitute a taking of private prop-
erty, and just compensation will have to be paid. The untenable
distinction that these prior cases have drawn between height
restrictions for buildings in cities as a valid exercise of the police
power, and airport height zoning ordinances as a taking of pri-
vate property, has had and will continue to have an adverse
effect. In Mutual Chem. Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore6 2 the court
stated that airport zoning was for the benefit of those who chose
aerial transportation and who owned airplanes and not for the
general public. This is no longer the case because the public bene-
59. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 17, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1940).
(Conway refused to grant the plaintiff a building permit to build a filling
station after he had arranged to buy the land. The plaintiff maintained that
this refusal amounted to a "taking" of his property. The court held that there
has been no "taking".) See also James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88
S.E.2d 661 (1955).
60. Gasque v. City of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 18, 8 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1940).
61. In Painter v. Town of Forest Acres, 231 S.C. 56, 97 S.E.2d 71 (1957)
it was contended that the town ordinance, requiring the plaintiff's business to
be closed from midnight to six in the morning, violated S.C. CoNsT. art. 1,
§§ 5, 17. The ordinance was held void as it restricted the right to use, enjoy
and dispose of property in direct contravention of the state constitution. See
also Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E2d 683 (1963).
62. 1 Av. Cas. 804 (1939) (supra note 19 and accompanying text).
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fit in air travel and airports has become almost overwhelming,
3
and as the needs and conditions change, so should the law.
Once accepting that the need for airport zoning exists, the
question arises as to what constitutes a valid exercise of police
power. It has been suggested that an ordinance must satisfy sev-
eral tests in order to be a valid exercise. First, the purpose must
be to promote the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare. Second, it must be reasonably necessary and related to fur-
thering the purpose. Third, it cannot deprive the owner of every
beneficial use of his property. Fourth, "it must confer upon the
public a benefit which is on balance commensurate with the bur-
den imposed on private property." 64 It has also been urged that
the distinction between height restrictions in comprehensive city
zoning ordinances and height restrictions in airport zoning ordi-
nances be set aside. If this is not done, airports will be burdened
with the eminent domain requirement. 5
South Carolina does not have a statewide enabling act. Fur-
ther, the County Planning Act applies to only a few counties and
even if the act applied to all, it would not be adequate to meet
the state's needs. Future growth in South Carolina will require
both more and larger airports, and the advent of jet service
increases these needs. Thus, an enabling act is needed in order
to create the necessary basis for local ordinances, and adminis-
trative functions could be established at the same time. There is
some chance that the constitutionality of an ordinance would
be questioned, but it would be held unconstitutional only when
unreasonable in its purpose and application. For our court to
find that a reasonable airport zoning ordinance is in the general
welfare and a proper exercise of the police power would be in
line with reason and the prior decisions of two sister states.66
Since Jankovick did not pass on the constitutionality of airport
63. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. stockholders report for 1965 indicates the
growth of air travel over the last decade. In 1956 their aircraft traveled ap-
proximately 5 billion seat miles. In 1965 their aircraft traveled approximately
17 billion seat miles. In 1956 the average aircraft seated 39 passengers, while
in 1965 the average aircraft seated 73 passengers. See PAN AmCAN WoRLD
AIRwAYs, INC. ANNUAL REPORT 14-15 (1965).
64. Comment, 1965 DuxE LJ. 792, 793 (1965).
65. Id. at 793. Approximately fourteen times more land than is needed
would have to be bought by the airport. See Wolf, Airport Approach Zoning
-A Present Need, U. CINc. L. RvV. 327, 330 (1948).
66. Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 160 So. 2d 6 (1963);
Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Harrel's Candy




Stoudemire: Airport Zoning: A Growing Need in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
height restrictions, South Carolina would not be bound by that
case and would be free to reach the better reasoned position by
ignoring the flimsy distinction drawn in Jankovick between city
and airport height ordinances. Further, the problems incident
to airport growth and safety will be lessened if zoning steps
are taken in advance of the need.
In determining what is a proper exercise of the police power
there must be a balancing of interests, and it has been stated that
the public interest in having an airport, its value to the com-
munity, its safety for passengers in airplanes, and the safe utili-
zation of the property must be balanced against the public inter-
est in preserving a private landowners rights.6 7 The use of a set
formula would be impossible; rather, each case should be deter-
mined on its own circumstances. No matter what the balance,
constitutional freedoms could never be completely abridged, and
for this reason the model enabling act and most state acts stress
reasonableness as the basic test. "Airport zoning restrictions by
their nature necessarily constitute an interference with recog-
nized property interests and may adversely affect the value of
the land in the surrounding areas."6 s However, it was established
in Village of Euclid that depreciation in land value does not
render zoning regulations invalid. "The crucial question is
whether the regulations in the light of the public interest, un-
reasonably limit or restrict the property owner in the use of his
property in relation to presently existing uses in the area and to
potential uses to which the property may be devoted."6 9 Thus,
the main issue will be how restrictive an airport zoning ordinance
can be without becoming unreasonable and thus invalid.7 0 At
67. See BmLyou, Am LAw (1963).
68. Young, Airport Zoning, 1954 U. oF Iint L.F. 261, 270 (1954).
69. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
70. The outline for an airport ordinance which might be reasonable is:
First: The area within one mile of the runway is restricted to existing farm
uses only, except for an airport terminal.
Second: The next mile radius is restricted to farm uses only, and the only
buildings must be in accordance with a fifty to one glide path ratio. No
dwelling houses are permitted.
Third: The third mile radius is restricted to industry that does not have elec-
trical equipment which would (a) interfere with the airplane, or with the
airport communications, (b) create glare, haze, fog, smoke, or any other
hazard which would interfere with the safe landing and takeoff of aircraft,
and (c) be in accordance with the fifty to one glide path ratio. No residences,
apartments, churches, or other public places are permitted.
Fourth: At either end of the runway a zone extends for three miles from
the runway, growing in width from 3,000 feet at the runway to 6,000 feet at
the end of the three miles. No buildings are permitted in these zones.
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present and without enabling legislation, it is impossible to tell
where the line will be drawn in South Carolina. Some feel that
the absence of clear precedents in South Carolina is a disadvan-
tage. This need not be the case, for while there is nothing on
which-to base a prediction of future developments, there is also
nothing to act as a hindrance.71 Most of our airports are still in
rural areas so that the need for zoning is just beginning to pre-
sent itself. Now, before the land becomes too developed, is the
best time to create and implement a thorough zoning plan.
Mr. Justice Cardozo aptly perceived the developing situation
by the statement in 1928 that aviation was an established mode
of transportation and that the future would only increase its use.
The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for
the new air traffic may soon be left behind in the race of
competition. Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, be-
cause its founders rejected the noble site of Byzantium lying
at their feet. The need for the vision of the future in the
governance of cities has not lessened with the years. The
dweller within the gates, even more than the stranger from
afar, will pay the price of blindness.
7 2
It must be kept in mind that this is a rough suggestion, based in part on 48
Ky. L.J. 273 (1960), and any effective ordinance must meet the needs of the
community and take into consideration for example, present existing uses,
available land, future needs and developments. Most important of all, the
ordinance must be practical.
71. The South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated its progressive ten-
dencies in other areas such as in extending products liability in Salladin v.
Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966), and in discovery in Ex parte
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., S.C. , 150 S.E2d 525 (1966), and in
Proctor v. Corley, 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965). Since we have a
broadminded court, susceptible to new ideas, the argument that a reasonable
airport ordinance is a proper exercise of police power is likely to fall on
fertile soil.
72. Hesse v. Rath, 248 N.Y. 436, 164 N.E. 342 (1928), quoted in Strunck,
Airport Zoning and its Future, 50 A.B.AJ. 345, 347 (1964).
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